



نامه محرمانه

وقتی در سال ۱۳۵۸ جمعی از دانشجویان ایرانی به سفارت آمریکا حمله کردند و آن را تسخیر کردند، موجی از نظرات و بحث‌های مختلف در جهان به راه افتاد. این دانشجویان دلایل متعددی برای خود داشتند. از جمله معتقد بودند که آمریکا قصد دارد در ایران کودتا کند و ادامه فعالیت‌های سفارت آن می‌تواند به نفع انقلاب ضربه بزند و موجب بازگشت رژیم شاهنشاهی شود. پیشینه فعالیت‌های آمریکا در ایران این گمان را تقویت می‌کرد. از یاد نبریم که ۲۵ سال پیش از انقلاب اسلامی، آمریکا علیه دولت ملی مصدق کودتا کرده بود و تکرار دوباره آن اتفاق دور از انتظار نبود. پس از تسخیر سفارت آمریکا، اسنادی در این سفارت یافته شد که برخی از نقاط مبهم ماجرا را کاملاً شفاف کرد. به همین دلایل بود که از همان روزها سفارت آمریکا با نام «لانه جاسوسی» مشهور شد. در این شماره یکی از این اسناد را مرور می‌کنیم:

مرداد ماه سال ۱۳۵۸، جاسوسی به نام جان گریوز در قالب یکی از اعضای روابط عمومی سفارت وارد ایران می‌شود. او این نامه را در مهر ماه همان سال تقریباً یک ماه قبل از تسخیر لانه جاسوسی، نوشته است. بخش‌هایی از این نامه را می‌خوانیم:

من حداقل دو برنامه را که می‌توانند به هرج و مرج و سقوط تدریجی بینجامند، در نظر دارم. یکی تحریک نیروهای تمرکز یافته توسط نارضایتی‌های منطقه‌ای و قومی است که اگر با این‌ها به اندازه کافی به طرز غلطی برخورد شود، ممکن است باعث تعطیل شدن و بسته شدن مناطق نفتی شوند، اقتصاد سنتی را از هم بپاشند، یا جوری ملی‌گرایی را خراب کنند که توده‌ها با رهبران مذهبی خود مخالف شوند.

نفاق در مدرسه‌ها بین محصلان، بین کادرهای مدرسه، و بین هر دو می‌تواند باعث بسته شدن مدرسه‌ها برای مدت طولانی و در نتیجه نارضایتی عمومی شود یا به خشونت‌های افراطی بینجامد تا مردم دوره‌های چهل‌روزه عزاداری را که نقش بزرگی در سقوط شاه داشتند، از سر بگیرند.

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
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None of these groups can move overtly to take power without risking annihilation at the hands of the Islamic fundamentalists who at present enjoy the overwhelming support of the masses. The Islamic fundamentalists are nonetheless vulnerable. I see at least two scenarios which could result in chaos and their eventual downfall: the centrifugal forces generated by ethnic and regional disaffections, if they are badly enough handled, could shut down the oil fields, disrupt the traditional economy, or so frustrate nationalism that the masses would become disenchanted with their inept Islamic leaders; dissension in the schools among both the students and faculty could either shut down the schools over a long period and lead to mass dissatisfaction or degenerate into violence and set off the 40-day martyr cycle which contributed enormously to the downfall of the Shah. (Iranians have a pathological penchant for mourning and a typical third-world vulnerability to the demands of youth.)

Target Audiences: If the foregoing analysis is a reasonably accurate picture of the influence structure of post-revolution Iran, in theory USICA target audiences are: the clergy, the secular politicians who run government and quasi-government organizations, the leaders of para-military groups, the leaders of the conventional armed forces, the Westernized managers and technicians, the liberal politicians, the leaders of the hardline leftists, ethnic and regional leaders, students and teachers, the media people who influence all these groups, and finally the masses. Including the masses among our primary audience may appear heresy, but I believe it is justified in the case of post-revolution Iran where institutions are so weak that real power depends almost entirely on the thrust of mass sentiment. There are no institutions or procedures to cushion the thrust of aroused mass sentiment, capricious or unrealistic as it may be.

Inaccessibility of Target Audiences. Because America in particular and the West in general are blamed (scapegoats) for most of the problems which beset Iran and are seen as the enemy of both traditional Islam and revolutions, USICA does not have easy access to many of the influential audiences cited above. Nor can we take initiatives without running some risk of arousing active hostility. Many of the means which USICA normally uses to engage target audiences in an ongoing communication process focused on issues of mutual interest are not feasible in post-revolution Iran. There are few Iranian fora for most American participants; Western art and publications are often seen as anti-Islamic and corrupting; and our exchange programs are ill-adapted to the needs and

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من به‌خصوص در مورد طولانی کردن برنامه فارسی رادیو صدای آمریکا و موفقیت اخیرمان در جا دادن فیلم‌های آژانسی در تلویزیون ملی نظر مثبتی دارم. چون همان‌طور که قبلاً گفتم، در این ارتباط توده مردم از اولویت خاصی برخوردارند.

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issue and each opportunity for dialogue on its merits without linking it to any other issue or rebuff. I recognize that such an attitude on our part makes planning and resource management difficult. But I nonetheless feel confident that we can operate on such a basis to excellent long-term effect. I therefore recommend that USICA Iran give top priority to acquiring the equipment, personnel, insights, structure, organization, and procedures which will give us the flexibility and resources to take full advantage of opportunity. (The revolution and its aftermath destroyed our physical plant, scattered our personnel, and made our old organization, program and procedures obsolete.)

More specifically, I am comfortable with the initiatives proposed in Ms. McAfee's "Communication on Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas" and the subsequent proposals developed by USICA Washington for Assistant Secretary Saunders and the NSC. I am particularly pleased with the plan to expand VOA Farsi services and our recent success in placing Agency films on national television, as I noted earlier, at this juncture the mass audience is a prime audience. I am also convinced that we should make the effort and take the risks involved in trying to enter into a genuine dialogue with the Islamic clergy and the leftists. I recognize that we are ill-equipped to communicate effectively with these two groups and that the kind of Americans (i.e., Jesse Jackson, Andy Young) most acceptable to them may be less than representative of the views of our own establishment. But the mullahs or the leftists are likely to be dominant for a long time to come. If Iran is important to us, self-interest suggests that we accept a sizeable portion of discomfort and learn to communicate effectively with mujahedins mullahs, pasdars, and even Fedayeen Khalq -- being careful of course to avoid being identified with them or with any other faction for that matter.

With warmest regards,

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من معتقدم، اگر ما عقیده‌مان را درباره تجاوز به حقوق بشر در ایران ابراز کنیم، در درازمدت به نفع آمریکا خواهد بود. ما می‌باید موضع مستحکمی در برابر آن دسته از رهبران ایرانی بگیریم که ما را امپریالیست و پادوی صهیونیست می‌خوانند، یا ما را به دخالت در امور داخلی ایران متهم می‌کنند.

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officials, a writer, an artist, and an IAS Tehran board member who is also a distinguished professor of law at Tehran University.

- Helped organize dinners at the Charge's residence which featured American films and in one case an American pianist. Guests included high ranking government officials, doctors, lawyers, and professors.
- Came up with books on state and local government requested by the Deputy Prime Minister for Cooperation.
- Talked with the Minister and the Spokesman at the Ministry of Guidance about recent expulsions of American journalists.

In addition to the items noted above, English courses at IAS Tehran and Isfahan are bringing in thousands of Iranians and enrollment figures may even approach pre-revolutionary figures by the second semester.

Reservations about the Regime: There is, of course, a good deal about the post-revolutionary Iran which is disconcerting to Americans: human rights violations, including summary executions; expulsion of American journalists; bans on much of the domestic press; mistreatment of minorities such as the Kurds and Bahais; frequent characterization of America as imperialist and Zionist dominated; and foreign policy postures inimical to U.S. interests. To make matters worse, we are not able to enter into meaningful dialogue about many of these issues with influential Iranians. It could therefore be argued that it is in the long-term U.S. interest to sharply limit our relations with Iran in order to avoid being identified with policies and actions which are opposed to our ideals and interests.

Recommendations: I believe that it is in the long-term U.S. interest to publicly express our concern over Iranian violations of human rights. We should also take firm issue with pronouncements by Iranian leaders which characterize us as imperialists and Zionist lackeys, or accuses us of intervention in Iranian internal affairs. Finally, we should strenuously object to the expulsion of American journalists.

On the other hand, I am convinced that Iran is today so fractured and disparate that it would be a mistake to assume that any disconcerting action or pronouncement represents Iran in toto. We should therefore avoid reacting on an across-the-board basis and treat each incident or pronouncement on an ad hoc, limited basis. Similarly, we should deal with each

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